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RELIGION AND LEGAL DISCOURSE: AN
INDIRECT RELATION
A RESPONSE TO STEVEN D. SMITH
RONALD

F. THIEMANN*

In his essay Steven D. Smith provides a provocative reading of an
important aspect of legal culture, what he calls "de facto disestablishment," the implicit secular assumption that religious beliefs should bear
no formal or direct relation to matters of law.1 He sketches four "zones"
within which this consensus of legal culture exerts its influence and then
offers a fascinating legal issue, the measurement of damages, by which
he seeks to raise some fundamental questions to the reigning secular
paradigm. I find myself in general agreement with Professor Smith's
thesis, though I will want to raise some critical questions about the provisional conclusions he seems to draw at the end of the essay. Indeed, I
am struck by an even broader sense of congruence between Professor
Smith's work on the legal and cultural dimensions of First Amendment
jurisprudence and my own work in the recently published Religion in
Public Life: A Dilemmafor Democracy.2 So the criticisms I raise should
be set against the background of a more fundamental agreement on the
larger issues of constitutional jurisprudence.
Given the substantial overlap in our positions, it is striking that Professor Smith cites neither my work nor any examples of the books and3
essays published by scholars of religion and theology on this topic.
Ironically, this essay is itself a minor symptom of the very malady Professor Smith so ably analyzes and criticizes viz., the separation of the
worlds of law and religion. Still, this conference and this essay offer an
invitation for scholars and practitioners of these fields to overcome the
* Dean and John Lord O'Brian Professor of Divinity, Harvard Divinity School.
1. Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L.
REV. 203,204 (1998).
2. See generally RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR
DEMOCRACY (1996).
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM JOHNSON EVERETr, RELIGION, FEDERALISM, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR PUBLIC LIFE (1997); see also WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE
WORDS EXTRA: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

(1994).
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isolation of scholarly worlds induced by "de facto disestablishment," and
I am pleased to have the opportunity to engage in common reflection on
these matters of shared interest.
Since I am a Christian theologian my thought tends to be organized
in trinitarian patterns, and so I will offer my remarks in three parts.
First, I will address the larger historical and cultural context within
which the phenomenon of de facto disestablishment resides. Second, I
will offer some critical remarks on the philosophical issues raised by
John Rawls and Kent Greenawalt. And then, finally, I want to focus on
the four "zones" of de facto disestablishment and present my criticisms
of Professor Smith's provisional conclusions.
I.
Early in the essay Professor Smith refers to a discussion between
Michael McConnell and Bruce Ackerman in which each speaker accuses
the other of disrupting a long-settled consensus in American political
culture concerning the place of religious convictions in democratic deliberation. It has become common practice for advocates of particular
positions on this subject to invoke the authority of an historical consensus in support of their own contemporary proposals. Ordinarily one
would think that one or the other of the opposing disputants must be incorrect; surely, the historical record cannot support two conflicting construals of the American tradition. Ironically, the American tradition is
itself sufficiently ambiguous to allow multiple, even conflicting, interpretations of this legal and political issue. Since the time of the framing of
the Constitution American reflection on the place of religion in public
life has been strikingly double-minded. The religion clauses of the First
Amendment to the Constitution were designed to maximize religious
freedom in both its individual and corporate forms. Two fundamental
concerns: to protect the free expression of religion in all its variety and
to delimit the influence of any particular religion animated the founders'
thinking about religion's role in American society. James Madison, in
particular, showed remarkable prescience in his concern to protect minority faiths from the tyranny of the majority, whether political or ecclesiastical.
Despite the Constitution's guarantee of religion's free exercise and
its de jure disestablishment of religion, the de facto establishment of a
cultural Protestant Christianity remained a reality at least until the midtwentieth century. Even the founders recognized that the American republic required an ethical citizenry for its successful operation. Madison
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in The Federalistnumber 45 argued that "the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value
than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object., 4 In the final
days of the Virginia ratifying convention, he expressed his views on this
matter with typical eloquence. "Is there no virtue among us? If there
be not.., no form of government can render us secure. To suppose that
any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea."5 While he defended the right of
religious liberty for all faiths, Madison, like the other founders, assumed
that the primary schools of virtue for the new republic would in fact be
communities of faith, particularly Christian churches.
And that is, of course, the reality described by Alexis de Tocqueville
during his journeys throughout the young American nation in the early
1830's. In a section of Democracy in America entitled "Indirect Influences of Religious Opinions Upon Political Society in the United
States" he identified Christianity as "the first of their political institutions' 6 because of its ability "to purify, control, and restrain, that excessive and exclusive taste for well-being"7 that so dominated the American
character. Despite the fact that religion "takes no direct part in the
government of [American] society,"8 it still functions, he claimed, to encourage the "sacrificing [of] private interests" for the sake of "God's
plan.., this great design... this wondrous ordering of all that is." Religion could function in this fashion in early America because
"Christianity reigns without obstacles, by universal consent." 9 Thus Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, writing in the same year as Tocqueville, could state without reservation the de facto establishment of
Christianity within the early American republic:
[I]t is impossible for those, who believe in the truth of Christianity, as a divine revelation, to doubt, that it is the especial duty of
government to foster, and encourage it among all the citizens and
subjects .... [T]here will probably be found few persons in this
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
5. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON

THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION 536-37 (Burt Franklin 1968) (1888).
6. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 316 (Henry Reeves trans.,
Vintage Books, 1945).
7. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 27 (Henry Reeves trans.,
Vintage Books, 1945).
8. TOCQUEVILLE, supranote 6, at 316.
9. ld. at 315.
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or any other Christian country who would deliberately contend
that it was unreasonable or unjust to foster and encourage the
Christian religion generally as a matter of sound policy as well as
of revealed truth ....Probably at the time of the adoption of
the constitution.., the general, if not the universal sentiment in
America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement
from the state, so far as was not incompatible with the private
rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship.'
De jure disestablishment and de facto establishment existed side-by-side
in the American republic for nearly two hundred years. It is not surprising, then, that Professors McConnell and Ackerman can both claim
an American consensus in support of their conflicting positions.
Sociologists now regularly refer to America's "three disestablishments." The first, the legal disestablishment is represented by the First
Amendment to the Constitution and the elimination of established
churches in the states by the mid-nineteenth century. As I have noted,
this legal prohibition had little effect on the symbolic power of our culturally established religion, Protestant Christianity. The second or religious disestablishment occurred with the fragmentation of America's
civil piety. With the rise of sizable Roman Catholic and Jewish minorities and the emergence of the distinctive witness of the black churches,
the predominance of cultural Protestantism began to wane.
Initially these minority communities appeared to be compatible with
and supportive of American civil religion. The remarkable cooperation
among communities of faith during the civil rights movement encouraged many to believe that America's civic faith could incorporate these
diverse religious traditions. But the fragile bonds that held these groups
together burst asunder during the divisive political debate that began
during the late 1960s. Traditional religious differences combined with
political disagreement to spawn the third moral disestablishment. Divisions within the body politic rendered America's civil faith incapable of
providing the common principles for personal and public morality.
During the 1950s and early 1960s it appeared that America's civic
piety would have sufficient resilience to incorporate these newly influential communities of faith. Indeed, in his influential study ProtestantCatholic-Jew," published in 1955, sociologist Will Herberg sought to
identify the "American faith" that had become the nation's new
10.

2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

603-05 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873) (1833).
11. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW:
RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (1955).

AN ESSAY

IN AMERICAN
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"common religion," a faith that transcended the doctrinal divisions that
had traditionally separated these communities. The growing popularity
of the phrase "Judeo-Christian" to describe the common heritage of
those two distinct traditions signaled a typical American confidence in
the ability of the "melting pot" to blend even the most divisive disagreements into a bland civic mixture.
This confidence was hardly well placed. Newly emergent religious
groups began to emphasize their particular and distinct identities. Jewish scholars demonstrated that the phrase "Judeo-Christian" functioned
primarily to repudiate the distinctiveness of Jewish faith by assimilating
its beliefs and practices to those of the dominant Christian tradition.12
Not only did this practice hide the characteristic emphases of Judaism
from pubic view; it also encouraged Christianity's historical tendency to
deny Judaism's continuing religious vitality. By distancing itself from
the dominant tradition, Judaism could both preserve its own heritage
and protect itself from the persecuting tendencies of Christianity.
Among African Americans, the black power movement spawned black
theologies that rejected the influence of the Anglo-European tradition
and sought to articulate the particularity of African and African American culture.
The feminist movement encouraged women to extricate their distinctive religious experience from the male-dominated patriarchal heritage within which it had been submerged for centuries. indigenous
revolutionary movements in third world countries emerged from communities of faith that stressed the uniqueness of the experience of the
oppressed. As liberation theologies offered increasingly sophisticated
methods for the analysis and critique of the structures of oppression, the
dominant tradition of America Protestantism became the target of an
emerging "hermeneutic of suspicion." American civic piety, so its critics
argued, could provide the symbols for our common culture only by systematically silencing the voices of minority communities. With the empowerment of those communities, the pretense of commonality was finally revealed.
The divisions that have surfaced since the 1960s and 1970s shattered
any illusion of political and religious unity within the American populace. The emergence of divisive battles over issues like Vietnam, nuclear weapons, abortion, the equal rights amendment, affirmative action, and gay and lesbian rights spread the hermeneutic of suspicion
12. See generally ARTHUR COHEN, THE MYTH OF THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITION
(1970).
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throughout American life. Political opponents no longer assumed that
they shared a common set of values or principles by which to adjudicate
their differences. Moral and political options were presented as incommensurable alternatives, and the art of compromise appeared to wane.
Interest group politics began to dominate the public sphere, and notions
of the common good and the public welfare seemed to fade from public
consciousness.
It is now clear that America's historic civic piety has disintegrated
and that no new public philosophy has arisen to take its place. Consequently we live among the fragments of shattered moral and religious
traditions, no one of which has yet shown its ability to provide a basis
for our common public life. Some commentators have suggested that
our moral disagreements are so profound that we will never reach consensus on the most basic policy issues. In such a situation politics becomes "civil war waged by other means,"' 3 as force, deception, and manipulation dominate the political atmosphere. Politics thus becomes a
mere clash of wills, as each party, interest, and faction, seeks to gain the
upper hand in the struggle for political
control. We are, one author as14
serts, in a state of "culture war.
In light of the disintegration of America's civil religious piety, it is
not surprising that many contemporary commentators have reached
back to secular Enlightenment sources to claim that the founders advocated both "a godless Constitution and... [a] godless politics.' 5 Scholars like Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore are seeking to reconstruct an historical constitutional tradition to support the legal claims
concerning a de facto disestablishment. This notion is appealing to
many scholars because of their fears that the introduction of religious
beliefs into political or legal matters will only make contentious issues
more difficult, if not impossible, to resolve. In light of America's third
or moral disestablishment, claims about a legal de facto disestablishment
have become more attractive to some. But the fundamental fact remains: The American legal and political tradition is sufficiently ambiguous to support both historical and normative claims for and against
de facto disestablishment.

13. ALISTAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 8 (1981).
14. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
15. ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE
CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 12 (1996).
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I.

The philosophical issues raised by Kent Greenawalt regarding the
propriety of public officials' and citizens' reliance upon religious convictions in their political decision-making must also be seen against the
background of America's third disestablishment. John Rawls' attempt
to identify the fundamental principles of liberal democracy takes its rise
from his recognition that "the fact of pluralism" is "a permanent feature
of the public culture of modem democracies."" Consequently, no moral
doctrine or conception of the good pursued by particular groups of citizens could conceivably serve as the unifying scheme for democratic society as a whole. Indeed, "a public and workable agreement on a single
general and comprehensive conception could be maintained only by the
oppressive use of state power."' 7 Thus Rawls argued in his early work
that such comprehensive schemes should be removed from the realm of
the political,though they may be allowed to flourish within the personal
and associational lives of citizens. Moreover, Rawls proposed the norm
of "public reason," the standard by which all discourse in a liberal democracy ought to be judged. "As far as possible, the knowledge and
ways of reasoning that ground our affirming the principles of justice and
their application to constitutional essentials and basic justice are to rest
on the plain truths now widely accepted, or available, to citizens generally. Otherwise, the political conception would not provide a public basis of justification."' 8
In A Theory of Justice, religion did not fare well when measured by

the standard of "public reason." In that early work religion was most
often invoked to exemplify an "unreasonable comprehensive scheme."
Those who reason on the basis of theology or faith, he asserted, rely on
"premises... [that] cannot be established by modes of reasoning commonly recognized."'" In his more recent work, however, Rawls has
granted that religious arguments can be introduced into public discourse
when "there is a profound division about constitutional essentials," 2 so
long as the appeal to comprehensive reasons serves to "strengthen the
ideal of public reason itself."2' Even at its most generous, Rawls' ac16. John Rawls, The Idea of an OverlappingConsensus, 7 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD.
1,4 (1987).
17. Id.
18. JOHN RAWL.S, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM 224-25 (1993).
19. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 215 (1971).
20. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supranote 18, at 249.
21. Id. at 247. For his most recent statement on these matters see, John Rawls, The Idea
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count of "public reason" does not provide wide opportunity for religion
to provide justification for the essential principles of constitutional democracy. Thus Rawls' work has given support to those who would encourage a de facto disestablishment within legal reasoning more generally.
Scholars like Bruce Ackerman7 and Robert Audi? have
introduced into legal and political philosophy two of the "dogmas of liberalism" regarding religion in public life. The first dogma states that religious beliefs are irrational or non-rational and therefore cannot meet
the standards of public reason. The second dogma asserts that there are
no available decision procedures for resolving religiously based moral
disagreements. Either you are left with indeterminacy in such arguments, or people fanatically seize upon one of the contending positions
and seek to impose it on the opposition. In neither case are we able to
reach cultural or political consensus. Thus, so the common argument
goes, religion should be relegated to the private realm and prohibited
from public affairs.
Against this much larger cultural and political background Kent
Greenawalt's work should be seen as an attempt to respond to the most
stringent positions regarding religion and public reason by asserting that
under some circumstancescitizens and public officials can justifiably rely
upon religious convictions in reaching political decisions.24 In my own
work I have sought to strengthen and broaden the role for religious belief and discourse in public life. Thus I have been working along parallel
lines to disprove the "two dogmas of liberalism" and to disturb the consensus concerning de facto disestablishment. If this implicit legal consensus does depend upon the wider philosophical context I have briefly
described, then the task of refuting that consensus will require rigorous
historical, philosophical, and theological analysis and critique.

of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 764 (1997).
22. See generally, BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).

23. See generally, Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations
of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (1989).
24.
I suggest that ordinary citizens should fee free to rely on convictions informed by
religious and other similar views when they consider difficult political issues. Legislators and executives appropriately take into account citizen judgments that are
formulated in this way. These officials should seek to resolve issues on the basis of
public considerations (including the view of citizens), but they also may sometimes
rely on their own religious or similar convictions. For judges, the demands of public
reasons are more insistent, but in rare instances they may also look to more personal
convictions.
KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 7 (1995).
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III.
I find Professor Smith's treatment of the "four zones of religious disestablishment" to be, for the most part, persuasive. Not only am I in
agreement with his argument concerning the first two zones of explicit
constitutional jurisprudence, I fear that the problems may be considerably more serious than he acknowledges in this paper; consequently, the
solutions may need to be more radical. I have argued at length in Religion in Public Life that the entire conceptuality employed by the
courts since Everson v. Board of Education is conceptually unstable
and incapable of providing consistent guidelines for either establishment
or free exercise clause jurisprudence. Precisely because the courts appear to accept the implicit truth of de facto disestablishment, they have
devised a set of concepts-neutrality, separation, and accommodation that impede clear and consistent interpretation and application of the
religion clauses. My own view is that this entire conceptuality should be
jettisoned and a new approach devised for First Amendment religion
clause jurisprudence. I do not know whether Professor Smith would
agree with this more radical approach, but I do think that his critique of
de facto disestablishment raises profound questions for the entire conceptual framework the courts have employed since the 1947 Everson
decision.
In his treatment of "zone three" Professor Smith offers an interesting observation regarding the instability of libertarian reasoning with
regard to religious questions and the law. He writes:
[T]he same person who will scorn what he views as simpleminded libertarian objections to one sort of paternalistic measure-Social Security, maybe, or drug regulations, or seatbelt requirements-may suddenly and passionately deploy the same
kind of simplistic rhetoric ("What right do you have to impose
your values on everyone") when the issue changes to abortion, or
euthanasia, or laws disfavoring homosexual conduct, or the
regulation of obscenity.27
He goes on to say "[iln other words on the assumption that neither the
libertarian argument nor the disestablishment argument would be
broadly persuasive if considered in isolation, why do two defective arguments add up to a compelling case?" '

25. THIEMANN, supranote 2, at 42-66.

26. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
27. Smith, supra note 1, at 209-10.
28. Id. at 211.
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While I find this analysis to be interesting and provocative, I do not
find Professor Smith's reasoning fully persuasive. The "fact of pluralism" suggests that public policies which carry the force of law should be
enacted only when sufficient consensus exists to justify the use of force
against those who defy the consensus. In the 1920's when no public consensus existed with regard to Social Security provisions, it may well have
seemed that enforced payroll deductions for future social benefits
served to impose the values of one political ideology upon the whole
populace. But in the aftermath of the Great Depression a thin but sufficient consensus developed to allow the implementation of such policies.
Similar historical developments changed national consensus about seatbelt ordinances and, most dramatically, about smoking in public places.
Laws that we now accept as commonplace would have been seen as inappropriate impositions in earlier decades, but changes in public perception, influenced by scientific or statistical evidence, brought about a sufficient consensus to justify such public policies. Today there is no such
consensus concerning issues like abortion, euthanasia, gay and lesbian
rights, and pornography, and so use of the force of law to establish one
of the contending positions may well be experienced as the "imposition
of your values on everyone else." Therefore, it seems perfectly reasonable to oppose the use of the force of law in a situation where no moral
or political consensus exists. The "fact of pluralism" need not imply either the doctrine of political neutrality or de facto disestablishment but
simply the recognition of the importance of democratic consensus in the
use of coercive measures.
Professor Smith's reflections on "zone four" of religious disestablishment raise important issues not just for the legal profession but for
democratic society more broadly. The absence of religious ideas and
perspective in legal discourse reflects a more general tendency toward
the marginalization and privatization of religion in secular democratic
societies. Professor Smith's questioning of de facto disestablishment can
be extended to secularization theories as well. For decades now secularization theories have dominated the intellectual landscape of most
academic disciplines. Secularization theories have argued that as capitalist economies and democratic politics expand worldwide we will witness a withering away of religion's public role. The complexity of modem secular societies renders irrelevant religion's traditional role of
providing an overarching framework of meaning for all citizens. Given
the diverse ways of believing and acting in the modem world, the dominance of any single religious view would lead to suppressions of freedom
contradictory to the aims of democracy. Moreover, the attempt to in-
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troduce religious controls in the economic sphere could only spell disaster for the play of free market forces essential to the world of business
and commerce. Freedom and self-determination are the hallmarks of
modem democratic and capitalist societies, and religious beliefs,
grounded as they are in authority and tradition, must give way, so the
secularization theorists argue, to the inexorable forward movement of
modernity. Religion in the modem world can no longer play a public
role, i.e., a role that provides common ground and shared principles for
belief and action. If religion is to survive modernity, it must do so in the
private lives of individual citizens. Religion, like other commodities in
the smorgasbord of democratic capitalism is something you are free to
choose or reject as personal preferences dictate. Religion in modernity
is "the kind of thing you like, if you like that kind of thing."
The attempts by secularization theorists to marginalize and privatize
religion have run up against the empirical reality of flourishing public
religion in almost every contemporary democratic society. The public
role of religion in American electoral politics, in the complex disputes of
the Middle East, in the tragic conflicts in Northern Ireland, in the freedom struggles in the Philippines and the Eastern European republics
provides ample evidence that the predictive power of secularization
theories is limited. As John Keane has recently argued,' secularization
theories have not only become historically anachronistic; they may also
contribute to the growing tendency for intolerance within democratic
societies that enforce secularization through the rule of law. The time
has come for a fundamental reconsideration of the validity of secularization theories.
Religion, as Professor Smith points out, is by its very nature pervasive; it is comprehensive in the sense that it influences all aspect of the
religious believer's life. It is this very comprehensive quality of religious
belief that leads Rawls to doubt whether religious belief can ever serve
as the primary basis for the justification of the constitutional principles
of a liberal democracy. While I firmly reject the privatization or compartmentalization of religion, I am reluctant to follow Professor Smith's
suggestions concerning a more direct relation between religious convictions and legal discourse, if that is indeed what he proposing. And, so I
want to conclude these remarks with some reflections upon his provocative example of the place of religion in the measurement of damages
within the legal system.
Professor Smith has shown, persuasively in my judgment, how con29. John Keane, The Limits of Secularism, TIMES LIT. SuPp., Jan. 9, 1998, at 12-13.
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sideration of the "vertical dimension" of our lives, the dimension of the
"religious," can provide deep moral guidance that might otherwise not
be available to the legal profession ° The problem arises with the fact
that law is by its very nature coercive; and we must raise the question
whether the religious dimensions of our lives should ever be used in a
coercive manner. Should, for example, consideration of the "vertical"
dictate legal limits to the amount of damages assessed in a liability case?
Even though a particular individual might acknowledge the important
lessons drawn from Tolstoy and other religious sources, it is not apparent that the law, which applies coercively to all citizens, should also acknowledge those lessons.
Christian theologians have long struggled with the question of how
the standards of the Christian Gospel, the so-called "law of love,"
should relate to the more retributive standards of law effective within
the state. How do love and justice relate to one another? How does the
command to "love your enemies" square with the necessity to engage in
defensive acts of war to protect innocent citizens? How can the Christian obligation to forgive the sinner be congruent with the need of the
state to punish the offender? While there have been many solutions offered to this dilemma throughout the history of Christianity, almost
every theological proposal requires a distinction between the standards
which reign in the "city of God," "the kingdom of the right hand," or
the "church," and those which reign in the "city of man," "the kingdom
of the left hand," or the "world." The vertical dimension cannot without
some adjustment become the standard for coercive action within a pluralistic society.
"It is not given to man to know his own needs," Tolstoy wrote. The
implication is, of course, that human needs are known finally only to
God. So it would also follow that it is not given to the law to know human needs, surely not in the way in which they are known to God. For
that reason the vertical religious dimension should not, I believe, play a
direct role in the shaping of law or in the coercive determination or
measurement of damages. Religious reflections of the sort Professor
Smith has so powerfully displayed in this essay function, rather, to suggest the limits of the law to address the full range of human needs. The
vertical dimension reminds us of our fallibility and particularly of the
folly of valuing human life in purely economic terms. Thus, its relationship to law is primarily indirect, critical, and corrective.
Thus, it seems that the vertical dimension of human life could, in30. Smith, supranote 1, at 221-27.
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deed, function to influence the very concept of justice that is operative
within the legal system. Professor Smith is certainly correct when he
calls into question the notion that monetary compensation will make the
injured party "whole." There is more to injury and to recovery than
simply monetary damages. But it is not clear to me that it is the role of
the law to treat personal injury "as one of the necessary challenges and
mysteries in human existence, rich with tragedy, opportunity, and
promise," even though I believe that latter claim to be true.3 Whether
injured persons recognize the opportunities for growth inherent in personal tragedy depends upon many factors, virtually all of which reside
outside the sphere of the law. Perhaps damages awarded to the victims
of injury should have the goal not of "making whole" but of providing
the material conditions that allow the re-shaping of character to take
place. Then justice (the awarding of monetary damages) may indeed
serve love (the positive re-shaping of character). But the relationship
between justice and love, between law and religion, should always remain indirect, so that the limits and possibilities of both realms might be
protected. If that is the force of Professor Smith's proposal, then in this
case legal and theological reflection reach a common conclusion. And
that fact alone might serve as encouragement to those who would bring
the worlds of law and theology into closer proximity.

31. Id. at 223.

